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rem cause of action under 314(2), this would preclude such a
dismissal. At this point, defendant could do one of two things:
he could withdraw from the action and take an in rein default,
or he could defend the action on the merits. If he does the
latter, he will subject himself to full in personarn jurisdiction
pursuant to CPLR 320(c).
Thus, the practitioner would be well advised, in cases where
there is doubt as to the basis for plaintiff's action, to move for a
dismissal under both CPLR 3211 (a) (8) and (9).
CPLR 3213:

Accommodation indorser of promissory note held
amenable to summary judgment.
In actions on an "instrument for the payment of money only,"
CPLR 3213 permits the plaintiff to seek summary judgment upon
service of a summons with a notice of motion and supporting
affidavits in lieu of a complaint. However, the determination of
who is liable on an "instrument for the payment of money only"
has been left to judicial interpretation.
It has been held that the maker or co-maker is liable on the
instrument itself.59 Also, in M. Gilsten, Inc. v. Ullman,60 it was
held that an action against an unconditional guarantor of a promisSory note was an action on the instrument.6 ' A question has
arisen as to whether an accommodation indorser of a promissory
note was primarily liable on the instrument and, thus, amenable
to summary proceedings under CPLR 3213.
2
The court, in Welbilt Concrete Constr. Corp. v. Kornicki,
answered this question in the affirmative. However, it appears
that, both under the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code, the accommodation indorser's liability is, in fact,
secondary, since there must first be a demand and notice of dishonor
before his liability is established. 63 Nonetheless, it would appear
that, although the accommodation indorser's liability on a promissory
note is secondary, since his liability is based on an "instrument for
the payment of money only," the speedy relief afforded plaintiffs
under CPLR 3213 should be available. However, if the defendant, in answering the plaintiff's motion, raises actual issues of
fact as to whether or not he did receive the necessary demand and
59See,

e.g., McGoldrick v. Family Fin. Corp., 287 N.Y. 535, 41 N.E.2d
86 (1942); Trietel v. Gibson, 131 Misc. 377, 226 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1928).
60 45 Misc. 2d 6, 255 N.Y.S2d 747 (Dist Ct Nassau County 1965).
61 However, the contract of guaranty in that case provided that an action
could be brought against the unconditional guarantor without first having
proceeded against the maker of the note, thereby making the guarantor
primarily liable.
6226 App. Div. 2d 661, 272 N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep't 1966).
63 See NIL §§ 3, 55, 14; UCC §§ 3-414, 3-415.
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notice of dishonor, it would appear that summary judgment should
not be granted since CPLR 3213 was intended to be used only where
substantial issues of fact were not present.
CPLR 3216: Plaintiff's unexcused general delay before filing note
of issue held ground for dismissal of action.
CPLR 3216 was amended in 1964 to provide that a motion
to dismiss an action for the plaintiff's failure to serve and file a
note of issue could not be granted until at least six months after
joinder of issue. Thereafter, if the defendant served a written
demand upon the plaintiff requiring a note of issue to be filed,
the plaintiff had forty-five days within which to comply, at the
risk of having his case dismissed. It was widely believed by
the plaintiffs' bar that this amendment enabled a plaintiff to file
his note of issue within forty-five days and thereby avoid a 3216
dismissal. However, confusion as to the effect of the amendment
still existed among the various departments; the first department
regarded it as merely creating a new basis for a 3216 dismissal,"
while the second department regarded it as being relevant to all
3216 motions.65
It appeared that the Court of Appeals had resolved the question
in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.66
There, the Court recognized the existence of a dismissal for general
delay and held that such a dismissal could be had although the
plaintiff had already filed a note of issue. 7 However, confusion
still exists, as illustrated by the recent case of Lunn v. United
Aircraft Corp.6
There, the majority, citing Commercial Credit,
dismissed the action because of the plaintiff's general delay antedating the filing of her note of issue. However, while concurring
in the result, Justice Benjamin stated that the court was empowered
to dismiss for general delay only with respect to delay following
the filing of the note of issue, where a note of issue has actually
been filed in response to a forty-five day notice.
It would, therefore, appear that further clarification by the Court
of Appeals is needed to dispose of this question.
-4Weeks v. Jankowitz, 23 App. Div. 2d 549, 256 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st
Depet 1965).
65McLoughlin v. Weiss, 23 App. Div. 2d 881, 259 N.Y.S.2d 941 (2d
Dep't 1965).
66 17 N.Y.2d 367, 218 N.E.2d 272, 271 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1966).
67 For a comprehensive discussion of the history behind Comnliercial
Credit see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 279, 312 (1966).
1026 App. Div. 2d 698, 272 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1966).

